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Do Organizational Forms matter? – An Econometric Analysis
of Innovativeness in the German Wastewater Sector
Abstract
In the German wastewater sector, innovations are often regarded to be the
key to both more efficient service provision and reduction of environmental
and health-related problems. However, it is unclear what factors foster these
innovations. One possible candidate factor is increased competition in this
sector and the entry of private service providers. So far, there is no empirical
evidence to answer the question of whether private firms are,in fact,more in-
novative than others.To address this question,we conducted a survey among
German firms that provide wastewater services and estimated a structural
model to explain firms’ innovativeness. Our results suggest that firm size im-
provesinnovativeness;however,privateserviceprovidersarenotsignificantly
more innovative than providers operated by local governments.We conclude
that restructuring the sector to form larger units may foster innovative activi-
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It is a common assessment that German water services meet high technical
standards. Nevertheless, the sector faces severe problems that have yet to be
solved:First,the grid-type network is partly outdated and requires enormous
future investments; second hormones and drug residua are currently filtered
from neither sewage nor drinking water,even though both are considered po-
tentially harmful to the environment and human health; last but not least,
growing wastewater charges have trigger ed disputes over the economic effi-
ciency of service provision. In fact, there is an intense discussion in Germany
ontheissueofwhethertheliberalizationofitswastewaterserviceswouldhelp
improve economic efficiency. However, no political decision has yet been
madetosubstantiallyopenthesectortomarketforces.Thisraisesthequestion
of how the sector’s performance could alternatively be improved.
Irrespective of the concrete market form,innovations are often considered as
possible means to solve the sector’s problems. While technical innovations
may be the key for solving environmental and health problems and may also
reduce the average costs of corresponding investments1,organizational inno-
vations may improve the economic performance in general.However,it is far
fromclearwhetherinnovationscan,infact,beregardedassubstitutestoliber-
alization or privatization, rather than complements, as privatized firms may
exhibit more innovative activities than those operated by the local authorities.
Moreover,it is not clear what factors drive the generation and diffusion of in-
novations,and how innovativeness can be fostered by policy measures.
This paper attempts to empirically assess the external factors that determine
the innovativeness of firms operating wastewater services. Our main focus is
on the question of whether firms less directly controlled by municipalities are
more innovative than those directly controlled by the authorities. We are
chiefly interested in the innovative performance of privately run firms as op-
posedtothoserunbylocalgovernments,sinceallowingformorecommitment
ofprivatefirmsontheonehand,andreducingthemunicipalities’influenceon
the other,might improve the sector’s performance.
The following section describes the role of local governments in the German
wastewatersector.Themainfocusisonorganizationalarrangementsbetween
the service provider and the local authority. Section 3 outlines the concept of
innovativeness. Section 4 discusses the econometric model. Section 5 intro-
duces the survey data used to estimate the econometric model, presents de-
scriptive analyses and discusses our estimation results.Finally,Section 6 offers
conclusions and policy advice that are based on our empirical results.
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1 E.g.decentralized sewage disposal might supersede costly grid-type networks.2. Organizational Arrangements and the Role of Local Governments
According to German law,wastewater services belong to the sovereign duties
of the municipalities, although these services do not necessarily have to be
provided by the local government itself. In fact, the municipality may even
transfer the task, but always remains responsible for proper sewage disposal
(Boscheck2002:142).2Ineffect,localauthoritiesareabletodeterminethede-
greeofcontroltheyexerciseontheprovisionofwastewaterservices,bychoos-
ing the organizational arrangement for the public utility.
Possible arrangements range from “municipal departments” that is complete
integrationofwastewaterserviceprovisionintothelocalgovernment,tofirms
held by private owners.Between these extremes,several organizational forms
such as “semi-autonomous municipal agencies”,“public law incorporations”,
“inter-municipal agencies”, and formally privatized but municipal held “mu-
nicipal enterprises” reflect gradual differences of the direct influence local
governments have on the provision of wastewater services. Appendix 1 pro-
vides a brief description of these organizational arrangements.3
Wastewater services are still protected from direct competition in Germany.
Therefore, there is no way to directly measure the effects that liberalization
and exposure to market forces would have on firm’s innovative activities. In
addition,the share of private firms is still very small.Nevertheless,numerous
changes in organizational arrangements have been observed in recent years,
leading to a substantially reduced share of municipal departments (BGW,
ATV-DVWK 2003: 12). It seems that municipalities increasingly regard the
provision of wastewater services an entrepreneurial rather than administra-
tive task.We interpret the reduction in municipal influence as the first step to-
wards opening the sector to private commitment and market forces and ex-
ploit the variation in organizational forms for identifying the effects of an in-
creased degree of market-orientation on firm’s innovativeness.
3. Innovations and Innovativeness
According to the OECD (1997:8) Oslo Manual,innovation stands for techni-
cal improvements of products and processes,as well as organizational innova-
tions. Since technical innovations, such as new products, have to be judged as
rather exceptional in the wastewater sector, and because information about
An Econometric Analysis of Innovativeness in the German Wastewater sector 5
2 The Federal Water Act has only recently allowed the delegation of responsibility; however,
most of the federal states have not yet adopted the corresponding legislation.
3 Several legal terms – such as organizational forms – that appear in this paper are specific to the
Germancase.Forthisreason,theEnglishtranslationsthatareusedhereoftenarenotunique.For
clarification, the appendix lists the original German expressions along with the English transla-
tions.new processes is weak in the data, our focus is on organizational rather than
technical innovations. Organizational innovations include measures to im-
prove the organizational structures of the firm and the work flow within firms
as well as the implementation of advanced management techniques, such as
Total Quality Management,and new or substantially changed corporate stra-
tegic orientations (OECD 1997:36).




tertiary degree,and expenditures on new technologies.Our analysis solely fo-
cuses on the output of innovative activities,that is,the implementation of cer-
tain novelties.
We define innovativeness as a firm’s general affinity and capability to carry
out innovative activities whose explanation is the ultimate aim of this paper.
Obviously, innovativeness represents a theoretical concept that lacks an ob-
servable counterpart.Nevertheless,firms reveal their innovativeness through
the generation of single innovations.In order to operationalize the concept of
innovativeness in our empirical application, we now employ a structural ec-
onometric model that incorporates the firms’ unobservable innovativeness as
alatentvariable,whiletheobservableoccurrenceofseveralorganizationalin-
novations serves as dependent variables.
4. An Econometric Model of Innovativeness
The model we employ for explaining firms’ general innovativeness was origi-
nally designed by Fertig/Schmidt (2002) to analyze attitudes towards immi-
grants.Althoughthetopicofourpaperisacompletelydifferentone,thereare
strong methodological links between both analyses.In both cases,the attempt
is made to identify the determinants of a latent variable from a wide range of
answers to survey questions that are more or less loosely related to the latent
variable of interest.
4.1 The Structural Model
It is assumed that the propensity X li
* of firm i to implement a certain innova-
tion l is determined by a vector of exogenous firm-specific variables
zzz ii K i ≡[ ... ]' 1 and the unobservable variable “innovativeness”Yi
*:
XY z z ii i K K i i 11 1 1 1 1 1 1
** ... =+ + + + + αδ β β ε
(1) 
XY z z Li L L i L li LK Ki Li
** ... . =+ + + + + αδ β β ε 1
6 Harald Tauchmann and Hartmut ClausenHere,i = 1,...,N indexes the firms.l = 1,...,L indexes those L organizational in-
novations that the firms were asked if they had implemented any of them.
Finally,εε 1iL i ,..., represent normally distributed mean-zero error terms that
may be correlated across equations.
For the latent variable Yi
*, we assume that it is determined by the same
firm-specific characteristics zi that enter (1):
(2) Yz z ii K K i i
* ... =+ + + γγ η 11 .
The additional random variable ηi is assumed to be mean-zero normally dis-
tributed,too.Again,it may be correlated with any of the equation-specific er-
rors εε 1iL i ,..., . By measuring zz iK i 1 ,..., in terms of deviations from sample
means,we normalize innovativeness so thatYi
* takes the value zero for firms
that display average characteristics.
We proceed by replacingYi
* in equation (1) by equation (2) in order to get a
reduced-form representation:
Xz z ii K K i i 11 1 1 1 1 1
* ... =+ + + + αθ θ ν
(3) 
Xz z Li L L i LK Ki Li





































































































4.2 Identification of the Structural Parameters
Ourinterestisonthestructuralmodelparametersγγ γ ≡[ ... ] 1 K ,whichcapture
the effects the exogenous variables have on a firm’s innovativeness.However,
withoutfurtherrestrictions,estimatingthecoefficientsθlk ofthereduced-form
model (3) does not allow for the identification ofγ.In order to obtain the nec-
essary identifying restrictions,we follow Fertig/Schmidt (2002:9) and assume










= ∑ for ,... .
That is,although we allow for direct effects of the explanatory variables zi on
the propensity to implement that do not operate through the latent variable
An Econometric Analysis of Innovativeness in the German Wastewater sector 7“innovativeness”,we rule out that the variables in zi can systematically influ-
encetheattitudetowardsallsingleinnovationsinanyotherwaythanbyinflu-
encing the firms’ innovativeness. In other words, an exogenous variable zki
may directly increase the propensity to implement one innovation and de-
crease the propensity to implement another, but it cannot increase the likeli-
hood for the implementation of all,or even the majority,of innovations with-
out increasing the firms’ innovativeness.This restriction allows for a separate
identification of direct and indirect effects of the explanatory variables.
However,inordertoidentifythestructuralparametersγ,anadditionalrestric-




may reflect a high value of δl as well as a high value of γ k. To deal with this











innovate to take the value one.4 Since there is no obvious way to metrically
measure the propensity to innovate, and since the absolute size of the coeffi-
cients, therefore, has no obvious interpretation, this normalization is less re-
strictive than one might think at first. On basis of (4) and (5), and with esti-
mated reduced-form coefficients θlk in hand, one can calculate estimates for
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for kK =1,..., .
Equation (6) states that the effect of a variable zki on firms’ innovativeness
can be expressed as the average effect this variable has on the propensity to




set of estimated effects to a single effect on overall innovativeness. Equation
(6)simplysuggeststakingtheaverage.Onemightargueinfavorofcalculating
a somehow weighted average rather than the simple un-weighted one. How-
ever,ifthereduced-formcoefficientsθlk areestimatedbydiscretechoicemod-
els, e.g. by probit, the parameters already contain an implicit weighting
8 Harald Tauchmann and Hartmut Clausen
4 This choice does not result in any loss of generality. Any other positive value could be chosen
just as well.scheme.In such models,only the ratioθν lk l std /( ) is identified.Therefore,the
effects are implicitly weighted by the standard deviation of the error term.In
other words, equations with high explanatory power receive more weight in
the calculation of the aggregate effect on innovativeness.
4.3 Estimation
The reduced form model (3) cannot be directly estimated,since XX iL i 1
** ,..., –
the propensities to implement the L single innovations – are latent variables.
However,theanswertothequestionofwhetheracertainorganizationalinno-
vationhasbeenimplementedcanbeinterpretedasanobservablecounterpart
to the latent variable “propensity to implement”. More specifically, it is as-
sumedthatthepossibleanswercategories(“notimplemented”,“implementa-
tion planned”,and “already implemented”– coded xli = 01 , ,or 2) correspond
tocertainlevelsofthelatentvariable.Thatis,ifthe“propensitytoimplement”
is low, a firm does not implement an innovation; if its propensity is high, the
firm does implement;and finally,if its propensity is somewhere in between,a
firm may consider the implementation of an innovation for the future. This
























This formulation allows for estimating the reduced-form coefficientsθlk along
with the threshold parameters µl using conventional ordered probit models.
The resulting system of ordered probit models would be estimated efficiently
ifallLequationsofthesystemweresimultaneouslyestimated.However,such
an approach would require the evaluation of multiple integrals. Simulated
maximum likelihood generally allows for this,but estimating the equations si-
multaneously remains extremely involved.
Inordertoreducetheestimationprocedure’scomplexity,theequationsofsys-
tem (3) are separately estimated.This means that the efficiency of estimation
is reduced, while consistency is preserved. Yet, one problem remains: inde-
pendently estimating the reduced-form coefficientsθlk through conventional
ML-techniques allows for calculating the structural model parametersγ k,but
not for calculating the corresponding standard errors.This problem arises be-
cause the error-covariance structure of the reduced-form model
(8) var( ) var( ) ( ) var( ) cov( , ) νε δη δ ε η ll l l l =+ +
2 2
cov( , ) cov( , ) var( ) cov( , ) cov νν εε δ δ η δ εη δ l m l m l m ll m =+++ (, ) εη m
An Econometric Analysis of Innovativeness in the German Wastewater sector 9exhibitsnon-zerocross-equationcovariances,whichareignoredbyestimating
themodelequationbyequation.Inordertotacklethisproblem,bootstrapped
rather than analytically determined standard errors are calculated for the
structural parameters. The reported standard errors are based on 250 boot-
strap iterations.
5. Data and Empirical Results
Our empirical analysis rests on a survey among German firms that provide
wastewater services which was conducted in 2003 (cf.Clausen et al.2003 for a
comprehensive descriptive analysis). The members of the “German Associa-
tion for Water,Wastewater and Waste Services”(ATV-DVWK) were used as
the data base for this survey.These approximately 2,000 organized firms rep-
resent only about one fourth of all 8,000 assumed suppliers in the sector
(Clausen/ Rothgang 2004: 156). Systematically addressing unorganized ser-
vice providers proved to be a rather ambitious task.As a consequence,we re-
stricted our attention to the organized providers. Out of the ATV-DVWK
members,683 firms were randomly drawn.The sample was stratified by loca-
tion and firm size, whereas large firms were systematically over-sampled. 237
firms returned completed questionnaires.5
5.1 Organizational Innovations
In addition to a few firm-specific characteristics, several innovation-related
questions are addressed in the survey.Firms were first examined on their sub-
jective perception of different factors encouraging or impeding innovations.
Here,we are more interested in behavioral facts than in stated perceptions,so
we focus on questions referring to innovation-related behavior. While the
questionnaire did not directly address specific technical novelties, firms were
asked about organizational innovations. In addition to a few sector-specific
novelties,we especially focus on those organizational novelties that are wide-
spread in the private industry.With particular respect to a specific set of eight
organizational innovations,firms were asked if they had already implemented
them,plantoimplementthem,orwhethertheyarenotconsideringimplemen-
tation at all.
Only firms that responded to the full set of questions concerning the eight or-
ganizational innovations are used for estimating the model. Because of item
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5 This raises the question of whether survey participation might be correlated with innovative-
ness,rendering any analysis biased.Unfortunately,well-suited instruments for survey participati-
on could not be found,obstructing any attempt to fix this potential problem.Surprisingly,partici-
pation in earlier surveys not related to innovations could not explain participation in the survey
considered here.Therefore,all reported results refer to specifications that do not correct for sam-
ple selection.non-response, the sample effectively used consists of only 161 observations.
Table 1 displays the distribution of answers in the sample. Appendix 2 pro-
vides a brief description of organizational innovations considered.
Obviously,none of the organizational novelties considered is already used on
a regular basis. Only “service and operation directions” and, to a smaller ex-
tent, “cost and activity accounting”, as well as “split wastewater charges” are
widespread among the firms in our sample,whereas ,“management systems”,
“incentive wages”, and “success-related fees” still seem to be rather excep-
tional in the sector.
5.2 The Explanatory Variables
The key concern of this paper is to assess whether direct municipal influence,
measured by a firm’s organizational form, has an effect on firms’
innovativeness.6 The relevance of this question is underpinned by the fact that
inthesurveymanyfirmsreportthatpoliticalinterventionsfromlocalauthori-
ties are regarded as major obstacles for implementing new technologies and
organizationalreforms(Clausenetal.2003:1568).Tocapturetheeffectsofor-
ganizational forms,a set of dummy variables characterizing organizational ar-
rangements enters the vector zi . Here, “municipal department” serves as the
base category.Table 2 displays – along with descriptive statistics for other ex-
planatoryvariables–thedistributionoforganizationalformsamongthoseob-
servations that are used for estimating the model.
One might argue that the organizational form is an endogenous variable
somehow related to innovations,rather than a determinant of innovativeness.
Changes in organizational arrangements, which have frequently occurred in
An Econometric Analysis of Innovativeness in the German Wastewater sector 11








Split wastewater charges 93 24 44
Success-related fees 133 21 7
Service and operation directions 50 33 78
Cost and activity accounting 80 30 51
Internal performance indicators 105 24 32
Benchmarking 117 16 28
Management systems 128 20 13
Incentive wages 137 13 11
Table 1
6 This corresponds to the theoretical literature concerned with innovations in other industries,
e.g.Arrow(1962)orAghionetal.(2002),whichoftenregardsmarketconditionsand,inparticular,
the degree of competition – in addition to the regulatory framework – to be the key determinants
for innovations.recent years, might even be regarded as innovations themselves.7 From this
point of view, indicators for organizational arrangements are ill-suited to ex-
plain innovativeness.However,we regard organizational arrangements as the
result of political decisions:the organizational form is a matter of local policy
and, therefore, is determined independently from the innovation-related be-
haviorofthefirmthatactuallyoperateswastewaterservices.Additionally,our
identification strategy requires us to assume that municipalities’ influence on
service providers operates purely through the organizational form, but not
through other unobserved channels.8
In addition to its organizational environment, the size of a firm might deter-
mine whether or not innovations will be successfully implemented. A lot of
anecdotic evidence is circulating about firms being either too small or too
large to innovate.Small firms are often assumed to lack the necessary human
andfinancialresources,whilelargefirmsmaylacktheflexibilitytoimplement
innovations.Because firm size is typically endogenous in standard markets,it
might be a rather problematic regressor. This problem does not apply to
wastewater services, where firm size is exogenous, because the disposal areas
are fixed,and each firm’s size can be measured in terms of the number of cus-
tomers.That is,we equate firm size and population size and employ the popu-
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Descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables in the sample
Explanatory variable Mean Std.Deviation Measuring Unit
Municipal department 0.2733 0.4470 indicator
Semi-autonomous municipal agency 0.3602 0.4816 indicator
Inter-municipal agency 0.2360 0.4260 indicator
Public law incorporation 0.0621 0.2421 indicator
Private law 0.0683 0.2531 indicator
Population 0.1198 0.4031 106 people
Population density 0.0490 0.0673 104 people/km2
Table 2
7 To control for changes in the organizational form,some specifications were estimated that con-
tained indicators for “form of organization recently changed” and/or “change of organizational
form planned”.Both variables turned out to be insignificant,while all other estimation results did
not change qualitatively.
8 To test these assumptions,the test procedure suggested by Rivers/Voung (1988) was employed
with state-specific dummies serving as instruments.The reasoning behind this choice is that diffe-
rences in state policy and legislation are likely to affect the choice of the organizational form (e.g.
withrespecttodelegatingthedutyofwastewaterdisposal),butareunlikelytohaveadirecteffect
on the adaptation of specific innovations. The joint hypothesis of organizational arrangement
being exogenous in all equations cannot be rejected. Equation-specific tests reject exogeneity
with respect to “cost and activity accounting”,“internal performance indicators”,and “split was-
tewatercharges”.Estimationresults,however,donotchangequalitativelyifthesethreeequations
are excluded from the model. Nevertheless, since it is questionable whether state dummies are
well suited instruments, test results have to be treated with reserve. Results for the original full
model are presented in Table 3.lation size of the corresponding disposal area as a regressor.Its distribution is
extremely skewed to the right.
Since disposal areas are exogenously determined,regional characteristics are
able to serve as regressors. We included the population density in our model,
since draining wastewater from highly populated areas appears to be a differ-
ent task than providing the same service in rural areas that possibly even lack
comprehensive common grid-type networks for draining sewage.
To cope with the quality of wastewater, which firms have to drain and purify,
firmsmightrelyontechnicalinnovations.Therefore,wastewaterqualitymight
determine innovativeness with respect to both technical and organizational
innovations. Unfortunately, we do not have detailed knowledge about the
wastewater qualities.
Finally, environmental policy regulations, such as water quality or technical
standards, are generally considered as key driving forces for innovations.
However, although environmental policy regulations typically vary across
time, they do not within cross-sections. For this reason, our data are ill-suited
for identifying such effects on innovations and this aspect has to be excluded
from the analysis.
5.3 Discussion and Interpretation of Estimation Results
Table 3 displays estimates for the structural model parameters γ. Estimation
results for the reduced-form parameters can be found in Table 4. Other vari-
ants of the model besides the specification presented in Table 3 were also esti-
mated. None of the explanatory variables additionally included proved to be
significant.Therefore,resultsforarathersmallmodelserveasthebasisforour
discussion.
None of the individual coefficients attached to dummies indicating organiza-
tional arrangement significantly deviates from zero9.Therefore,municipal de-
partmentscannotbejudgedtobemoreorlessinnovativethananyotherorga-
nizational form. However, since we are not interested in the base category
“municipal department”in its own right,this result may be of secondary inter-
est.More importantly,these coefficients are also jointly insignificant,with the
p-valueofthecorrespondingWald-testbeingashighas0.8801.Thatis,wecan-
notfindanyevidenceinthedatatosupportthehypothesisthatinnovativeness
systematically differs for different organizational forms. This outcome comes
as a surprise,bearing in mind our argument that the organizational form cap-
tures the degree of interference from local governments to utilities’ business.
An Econometric Analysis of Innovativeness in the German Wastewater sector 13
9 If the results are presented alternatively in terms of “deviations from the share-weighted
mean”,on the basis of appropriate Haisken-DeNew/Schmidt (1997) standard errors,all parame-
ters are insignificant,too.Since many firms regard interference from local authorities to be a major ob-
stacle to the introduction of novelties, we expected firms less directly con-
trolledbylocalmunicipalitiestobemoreinnovative.Threedistinctarguments
might explain why this hypothesis is not supported. Firstly, firms may incor-
rectly perceive local authorities as obstacles to innovations due to a severe
subjectivity bias.
Secondly, the influence of local authorities might be innovation-specific, i.e.,
local authorities may obstruct one individual innovation and promote an-
other,butdonotinfluencethefirms’innovativenessingeneral.Intermsofthe
structuralmodel,thishypothesiscorrespondstoββ 1kL k ... deviatingfromzero,
while the respective parameterγ k equals zero.10 The parameters ββ 1kL k ... are
not identified; hence, we are unable to test this hypothesis.11 Nevertheless,
since local political and administrative influence is often mentioned as both a
drivingforceandanobstacletotheimplementationofinnovations,thisexpla-
nation has some intuitive appeal.
Finally, organizational arrangements might just be labels that do not indicate
actual independence from political or administrative interference. In other
words,even a privatized firm operating wastewater services might still heavily
depend on the decisions made by local authorities. This argument is particu-
larly relevant,since several private firms in the sample are privatized in form
only,not materially.12
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Estimated structural model coefficients
Explanatory variable Estimated coefficient Standard error
Semi-autonomous agency 0.2689 0.5545
Inter-municipal agency 0.2164 0.5636
Public law incorporation –0.1255 0.8335
Private law 0.7389 0.8221
Population 1.4746* 0.7085
Population density 4.2511** 1.2862
Authors’ calculations.– ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01- and 0.05-level,respectively.
Table 3




reduced form parametersθlk, attached to the indicators of organizational arrangement (see Tab-
le 4),are jointly significant.This might be regarded as an argument in favor of the latter hypothe-
sis.Nevertheless,this argument is not fully consistent with the structural model,since the structu-
ral parameters of interest,i.e.ββ 1kL k ... ,coincide withθθ 1kL k ... only ifγ k = 0 holds.However,even
though we cannot rule outγ k = 0 on the basis of our test results,we also cannot prove thatγ k = 0
holds.Incontrasttothedummiesindicatingorganizationalforms,thecoefficientsat-
tached to the population within the disposal area,i.e.the size of the firm,and
the population density are both positive and significant. That is, larger firms
and those operating in highly populated areas are significantly more innova-
tive than smaller ones and those operating in rural areas.13 In fact,the density
of population in the disposal area turned out to be the most highly significant
regressor in any specification of the model that was estimated.
Since the German wastewater sector is characterized by a huge number of,
mostly,very small service providers,which are likely to lack the recourses for
being innovative, the result that large firms are more innovative than small
onesmaynotcomeasasurprise.Toexplain,however,whyinnovativenessisso
strongly determined by the density of population requires some discussion.
The main reason to include population density is to account for differences in
physical environment in which firms operate, but the coefficient might also
capture another effect.Areas of high population densities are typically found
in large cities.Cities,however,may provide not just a natural but also a social
environment that enhances innovativeness. Research facilities, firms that al-






































































































































































the econometric application, unfortunately, cannot distinguish between formal and material pri-
vatization.
13 Becauseofthestructureofthemodel,thecoefficients’absolutesizehasnonaturalinterpreta-
tion.ready have experienced technical or organizational novelties,and other insti-
tutions that can provide information about innovations, are typically located
in large cities. Therefore, population density might be a rough proxy for a
firm’s integration into innovation-enhancing networks.
This interpretation is supported by results obtained from slightly modified
models,for example one model,in which “length of the grid per inhabitant”is
substituted for “population density”.In other words,population density is re-
placed by a closely related, but purely technical, variable. Even though both
variables are negatively correlated,“grid per inhabitant”turns out to be insig-
nificant,in contrast to the original regressor.14 Another specification adds the
shareofhighlyqualifiedemployeeswithinafirm’sregionoflocationtotheset
of explanatory variables, emphasizing how important the access to human
capital is to innovation. This modified model yields similar results than the
original model.15 In short, it can reasonably be concluded that it is in fact the
socio-economic,but not the physical environment that drives the effect.Nev-
ertheless, it seems difficult to pin this effect down to a single, clearly defined
determinant.
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The aim of this paper was to identify determinants of the innovativeness of
German firms that provide wastewater services. Surprisingly, the organiza-
tional form,i.e.legal dependency from local authorities,cannot explain firms’
innovativeness:Our estimation results,therefore,do not support the hypothe-
sis that a change in organizational arrangement and, in particular, a reduced
influence of municipal councils will improve the innovation-related perfor-
manceofserviceproviders.Thus,reformsdirectedtowardsincreasedlegalau-
tonomy do not seem to be the first policy choice to foster innovativeness.
However,with respect to the question of privatization,this conclusion should
be interpreted cautiously. The German wastewater sector displays only the
early signs of privatization.Correspondingly,our sample is comprised of just a
few private firms that often do not even exhibit actual private ownership.For
this reason, one cannot expect that effects of the commitment of private ser-
vice providers can easily be identified in the data. Nevertheless, such effects
could still be substantial if a higher level of private commitment were actually
reached.
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14 All other results remain qualitatively unchanged:Organizational arrangements are still insig-
nificant,while the impact of size appears even to be more pronounced.
15 Including both explanatory variables simultaneously leads to individually (marginally) insig-
nificant coefficients, while jointly they are highly significant. In fact, both are substantially (0.6)
positively correlated. If either “highly qualified employees” or “population density” is included,
estimates do not deviate qualitatively.Incontrast,thedensityofpopulationwithinthefirms’areasofsupplystrongly
determines the firms’ innovativeness. This might be a “big city effect” rather
than a genuine “population-density effect”, resting upon integration into in-
novation-enhancing networks and access to human capital,which is rather lo-
cated in city centers. This finding might offer a starting-point for pushing
innovativeness:Firms apparently benefit from a socio-economic environment
that offers access to sources of innovations.Therefore,general investments in
research and education are at least likely to have positive effects on
wastewater services,too.
Finally, large firms proved to be more innovative than small ones suggesting
that even a moderate restructuring within the existing legal framework that
leads to larger units may help to foster innovations and improve the efficiency
oftheGermanwastewatersector.Fromthispointofview,aprocessofmergers
and acquisitions – which has already started in drinking water supply services
– could be  beneficial for the wastewater sector as well.
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Appendix 1: Organizational Arrangements
A municipal department (Regiebetrieb) is legally and organizationally a de-
pendent part of the municipality. Its finances are integrated in the general
community budget,and it often does not have an accounting system to call its
own.All decisions are made by the municipal council.
The semi-autonomous municipal agency (Eigenbetrieb) is also a legally de-
pendent part of the municipality. In contrast to municipal departments, how-
ever, it is a separate municipal entity that operates clearly defined budgetary
allotments on its own (Holzwarth/Ewens 2001:48).
The public law incorporation (Anstalt des öffentlichen Rechts) concerns a
firm under public law with its own legal status that can be set up by a state
bodyonlyonthebasisofaspecificlaw.Publiclawincorporationarrangements
are exempted from any tax (Hansen et al.2000:47).
Inter-municipal agencies (Zweckverband) and water and soil management as-
sociations (Wasser- und Bodenverband) are mainly associations of municipal-
ities. This way, several municipalities can accomplish their tasks jointly. Both
organizationalarrangementshavetheirownlegalstatus,makingthemlessde-
18 Harald Tauchmann and Hartmut Clausenpendent from single responsible municipalities than municipal departments
are. Additionally, they can use a semi-autonomous agency for fulfilling the
wastewater services (Holzwarth/Ewens 2001:49).
Incontrasttothesefivetypesoforganizationalforms,wastewaterservicescan
also be arranged under private law. “Private”, however, does not necessarily
mean that the entire firm or even shares are held by private owners (material
privatization); it also labels firms that are still entirely publicly owned while
operated under private law (formal privatization).Three general types of pri-
vate arrangements can be distinguished:
Amunicipalenterprise(kommunaleEigengesellschaft)isusuallyorganizedas
a limited liability company (GmbH) or as an incorporated company (AG).
The entire shares are held by the municipality.The firm is independent of the
local government in terms of its organization and its accountancy; however,
the municipality has influence through the supervisory board.
In the case of a management and services enterprise (Betriebsführungsgesell-
schaft), the ownership of the assets and the corresponding responsibility for
investments both remain with the municipality,whereas the private firm runs
the wastewater treatment plants,etc.
Joint ventures and co-operating enterprise (Kooperationsgesellschaft) repre-
sent public utilities, in which a private firm holds a (typically minor) share in
the firm’s capital. Other types of organizational arrangements involving pri-
vate firms may occasionally occur, whereas completely private wastewater
firms are extremely rare in Germany.
Appendix 2: Description of Organizational Innovations
Split wastewater charges (gesplitteter Gebührenmaßstab): In principle,
wastewater charges can be calculated in two different ways. The common
method exclusively takes the amount of freshwater used by the consumer as
the basis of the charges. In contrast, “split wastewater charges” combine two
criteria. The first charge is for sewage that results from freshwater consump-
tion. The second one is for rain run-off and depends on, among other things,
the size of the sealed surface. Thus, the polluter-pays-principle is realized by
using a “split wastewater charge”rather than an exclusively freshwater-based
measure.Nevertheless,about three out of four German municipalities use the
latter one (Rahmeyer 2002:367).
Success-related fees (Erfolgshonorarvereinbarung) refers to fees that archi-
tects and engineers receive. These fees are traditionally calculated wholly on
basis of production costs. Since 1996, a revised ordinance has allowed for the
agent’s fee to be partly dependent on cost-reduction effects of so-called tech-
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newal of a sewage plant is allowed to pay the architect an extra fee of up to
20 percent of the cost saved by an innovation.In our survey,a mere 4 percent
of the firms already use this instrument,and further 14.4 percent intend to use
it.
Service and operation directions (Dienst- und Betriebsanweisungen) are spe-
cial legally defined bureaucratic means to systematically concretize a firm’s
tasks,regulate the duties of the staff,and create norms for dealing with the fa-
cilities. Their implementation is regarded as an organizational innovation. In
detail, “service directions” explain what the task “wastewater disposal” is
comprisedof,andwhichsingletaskshavetobefulfilled.Theynamethelegally
responsible persons and assign duties.“Operation directions”describe the fa-
cilities (e.g.sewage networks or sewage plants) and list the corresponding du-
ties to operate and maintain the facilities. Beyond these two types, more de-
tailed instructions about specific parts of the technical facilities can also be
used.
Cost and activity accounting (Kosten- und Leistungsrechnung) deals with the
coverage and assignment of costs to cost units (i.e.a product) and cost centers
(i.e.adepartment)inordertodeterminehowcost-intensivethedifferentparts
and outputs of a firm are.While “cost and activity accounting”is part of dou-
ble entry-bookkeeping and therefore standard for private enterprises,it is not
mandatoryforpublicinstitutions,andthereforenotforpublicutilities,either.
Internal performance indicator systems (interne Kennzahlensysteme): Al-
though closely related to “cost and activity accounting”, “internal perfor-
mance indicator systems” represent a wider approach. This instrument can
deal with all kinds of performance categories, such as quality, reliability, cus-
tomer service,sustainability,and economic efficiency,and can,therefore,look
at monetary as well as non-monetary indicators.
Benchmarking is related to “performance indicators systems”. In contrast to
these, benchmarking restricts the analysis not only to indicators concerning
the own firm,but also compares them with those of its peers.If done properly,
benchmarking can help to reveal any hidden potential to catch up with the
most efficient firm. In Germany, benchmarking is performed by utilities on a
voluntarybasis,andinmostcases,theinformationremainsconfidential(WRc/
Ecologic 2002:112).Besides,benchmarking initiatives are often comprised of
only one or a few processes.As a contrast to this,it is used for ex ante regula-
tion of the English and Welsh water sector.
Management systems (Managementsysteme) seek to improve the quality of
processes and products,as well the management of environmental and health
risks of drinking water and wastewater services.Certain management systems
20 Harald Tauchmann and Hartmut Clausencan be certified according to the standards defined in ISO 9000 pp. or
ISO 14001; by doing so, a firm signals that its processes have reached a good
and generally accepted quality.
Incentive wages (Entlohnungs- und Anreizsysteme) reward the staff for good
working results, special achievements, etc. This organizational innovation is
considered because traditional payment systems used in the public sector are
often considered to be inflexible.
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